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In the field of commercial nuclear reactor security, the concept of target sets has 
matured since its invention in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the codification of target 
set regulations by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2009 and 
publishing of official guidance in 2010.  Target sets have evolved into a complex and 
useful tool to develop and test a protective strategy.  By their definition, target sets are the 
“minimum combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from 
performing their intended safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would 
likely result in significant core damage” and are strongly related to probabilistic risk 
assessment.  Though current guidance encourages the use of probabilistic risk assessment 
to inform the development of target sets, there exist no tools to assist in developing the 
hundreds of thousands of equipment combinations that meet the definition of target sets.  
This report seeks to outline the requirements for a computer code system that 
would use a probabilistic risk assessment to provide the backbone for the development 
and maintenance of target sets for a commercial nuclear reactor or other complex facility. 
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Background on Target Sets 
The concept of Target Sets is based in the field of nuclear reactor facility security.  
The term was first used to describe the specific combination of equipment that would 
have to be made inoperable in order for an adversary to effect core damage.  The current 
definition is found in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.81 “Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear 
Power Reactors.”  RG 5.81 defines target sets as: “The minimum combination of 
equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from performing their intended 
safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant 
core damage (e.g., nonincipient, nonlocalized fuel melting and/or core destruction) or a 
loss of spent fuel pool coolant inventory and exposure of spent fuel, barring extraordinary 
actions by plant operations.”  The definition of and guidance on target sets took time to 
mature as the NRC staff focused efforts to review and update security regulations and 
guidance after the attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Target sets were initially used as part of the NRC Operational Safeguards 
Response Evaluation (OSRE) Program conducted during the 1990s at licensed United 
States (US) commercial nuclear reactor facilities through 2001.  In the OSRE program, 
the NRC requested licensees submit to Force-On-Force (FOF) exercises to test the 
effectiveness of a licensee’s protective strategy.  Target sets were used as an evaluation 
tool, providing the groups of targets that the mock adversarial force sought to destroy or 
compromise.  For these evaluations, target set development guidance to licensees was 
unsubstantial, but was sufficient for the optional FOF exercises and accompanying 
evaluations at that time.   
After the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued NRC Security Order EA-
02-026 “Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Nuclear Power 
Plants,” in 2002 and EA-03-086, “Design Basis Threat for Radiological Sabotage,” in 
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2003 to licensees to increase security precautions at reactor facilities.  The security orders 
dictated that FOF exercises be conducted at each commercial nuclear power plant at least 
once every three years, and required licensees to create and maintain target sets to inform 
the protective strategy and be used in the FOF program.  The NRC did not issue guidance 
on target sets, and licensees instead used industry-developed guidance that was intended 
primarily for FOF exercises, that being Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 03-11, “Guidance 
for the Preparation and Conduct of Force-on-Force Exercises.”  In 2006, the NRC Staff 
planned a large power reactor security rulemaking (that included target sets), but in 2007 
NRC Commissioners instructed the Staff to terminate the rulemaking and instead develop 
guidance for target sets.  Preliminary work was conducted and guidance was given to 
new reactor applicants in September 2009.  Target sets were planned to be included in a 
future rulemaking to update to Title 10 Part 73 Section 55, “Requirements for physical 
protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage,” 
(10 CFR 73.55).  
Security orders EA-02-026 and EA-03-086 were included in new and updated 
security regulations and guidance to licensees though the update of 10 CFR 73.55 on 
March 27, 2009.  A part of this update, in subsection (f), is the first codification of target 
sets for a commercial nuclear reactor facility.  Initial guidance to meet the requirements 
for target sets was published in RG 5.76, “Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear 
Power Reactors” in July 2009, but was limited in scope and detail.  Expanded NRC 
guidance on meeting the new target set requirements was not published until November 
2010, when the NRC staff issued RG 5.81. 
RG 5.81 expanded greatly on what was previously available, providing more 
detail on documentation and thoroughness, especially concerning operator actions, plant 
operation modes, cyber-attacks and flooding and fire impacts.  Though not determined to 
be an increase in regulatory scope, RG 5.81 outlined an expanded view of NRC staff 
expectations on meeting the new Target Set requirements in 10 CFR 73.55 published in 
2009.  RG 5.81 stressed the traceability of a target set’s origin, to understand the original 
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safety basis and analysis for the inclusion of components and operator actions within the 
target sets.   
 
Relationship of Target Sets to Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
RG 5.81 stresses the use of site safety basis documents in developing target sets, 
specifically the usefulness of using a site’s Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).  A PRA 
is a thoroughly developed and vetted tool that captures most of the equipment failure 
combinations that lead to core damage.  The equipment combinations found in the PRA 
have an overlap with those found in target sets, and thus the PRA can be considered a 
natural starting point in developing target sets.  There exist key differences between 
PRAs and target sets in the treatment and representation of several factors that must be 
considered when using a PRA to create target sets.  PRAs and target sets differ on: 
initiating events, failure probabilities, component failure modes, inclusion of passive 
components, operator actions, non-safety related components, mitigating systems, 
flooding, fire, and cyber security.   
PRA uses initiating events as the starting point for events that challenge the safety 
of the plant.  These initiating events require the use of safety systems to return the reactor 
to a safe condition.  Examples of PRA initiating events are: loss of coolant accident 
(LOCA), loss of offsite power (LOOP), and reactor protection system (RPS) trip.  
Initiating events in the PRA begin the challenge to the plant, and thus occur first 
chronologically.  Target sets do not use an initiating event per se, in that the destruction 
or compromise of target elements does not need to occur in any specific order, and thus 
no target is necessarily “first,” but one target element of each set must challenge the 
safety of the plant if the adversary wishes to cause core damage. 
A PRA is composed of event trees that begin with initiating events.  The event 
trees contain markers for systems whose failure or success determines the state of the 
reactor.  Figure 3 through Figure 7 (in the appendix) show examples of event trees for 
several initiating events.  The systems contained in the event trees are then modeled in 
individual fault trees, to represent the failure modes of the system with individual 
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components.  Figure 8 through Figure 23 (in the appendix) show examples of the fault 
trees associated with the systems represented in the event trees of Figure 3 through Figure 
7.  Each different component failure combination, starting with an initiating event and 
including components from each applicable fault tree, is represented by a cutset.  Each 
component in the fault trees has associated failure probabilities, and these probabilities 
are summed to give a failure probability for each cutset.  In this way, PRA can determine 
those pieces of equipment that provide the greatest contribution of risk to a system or 
reactor.  Target sets do not use failure probabilities, and instead assume that if an 
adversary reaches a target with the time and capability to compromise or destroy that 
target, then the target is compromised or lost.  Target sets should consider if targets are 
“achievable,” that the adversary is capable of compromising or destroying the target.  For 
example, if the target is a 24” steel reinforced concrete wall, and the adversary is 
equipped with a manual chisel, the target could be declared “unachievable” and justified 
with an analysis on the time required to defeat the wall.  Adversary characteristics are 
detailed in RG 5.69, “Guidance for the Application of Radiological Sabotage Design-
Basis Threat in the Design, Development and Implementation of a Physical Security 
Program that Meets 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements.” 
PRAs will analyze different failure modes for components within fault trees.  For 
example, a pump could fail by having a seal fail, having an incomplete electrical 
connection within the motor housing, or having a bearing failure.  These different failure 
modes are often included separately within a PRA, as the different failure modes have 
different failure probabilities that contribute to the failure probability of the pump.  
Target sets do not consider different failure modes, as after the adversary reaches a target 
element, many different failures options exist, and thus an adversary reaching a target 
element is considered bounding.  Target sets should consider different compromise states 
of components, as an adversary could cause a system to work against the safety of the 
plant (for example, activing a pump to remove coolant water from the reactor coolant 
system and dump it outside the building).   
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Internal event PRAs analyze the failure probability associated with random 
failures of active Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) (pumps, valves, etc…) 
within the site itself, and external event PRAs consider the effect of external events 
(winds, seismic events, external flooding) on SSCs within the plant.  The internal events 
PRA usually does not consider the random failure of passive components (pipes, tanks, 
and flood and fire barriers).  External events PRAs do include many of these passive 
components (as their failure is considered under the effect of specific conditions).  Target 
sets fully include, with equal weight, passive components, as an adversary could attack 
passive or active component to the same effect. 
A PRA will consider operator actions as events in a fault tree with human 
reliability of making mistakes or forgetting intentional actions in mind.  Target sets also 
consider operator actions, but require that they meet six criteria set forth in RG 5.81 
section 6.4 in order to be credited in target sets:  “(1) sufficient time is available to 
implement these actions, (2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, (3) 
adversary interference is precluded, (4) any equipment needed to complete these actions 
is available and ready for use, (5) approved procedures exist which have entering 
conditions outside of severe accident mitigation guidelines (SAMG) or equivalent, and 
(6) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the 
scenario assumed.”  Target sets require greater guarantees on the completion of operator 
actions as random failures/mistakes are not taken into account.  Operator actions are 
considered target elements, and the equipment, operator, or environment for the action 
could all be determined to be separate targets associated with one operator action. 
A PRA is primarily composed of safety-related pieces of equipment, but can 
include non-safety related pieces of equipment if they are deemed risk significant.  
Similarly, target sets are primarily composed of safety-related equipment, but can also 
include non-safety related equipment.  SSCs, such as extra purpose-positioned pumps, 
hose, and water sources for emergency makeup water addition to the reactor could be 
included within target sets. 
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A level 2 PRA addresses the probability, size and timing of offsite releases 
following core damage.  Those SSCs that are included within the level 2 PRA are those 
that would limit or mitigate damage and release, including the containment structure, 
valves, filters, and environmental control systems.  Target sets focus on SSCs that lead to 
significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage, and do not consider containment or 
mitigating systems. 
The internal and external event PRAs consider the effect of flooding on plant 
safety systems.  For internal events, flooding from active and traditional sources (pumps, 
LOCAs, etc.) is considered with the expected performance of interior flood barriers.  
External event PRAs consider expected external flooding based on the flooding history of 
the surrounding area.  Target sets should consider interior or exterior flooding from a 
multitude of sources.  As adversaries can defeat flood barriers and cause flooding in 
previously unanalyzed areas, target sets should consider flooding/water damage far 
beyond what is found in the PRA.  
A fire PRA may be conducted (consistent with National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) 805) for internal or external events.  Similar to flooding, a fire PRA 
would consider only traditional fire ignition sources with the expected performance of 
fire barriers.  Target sets should consider the effects of fire beyond the PRA, as an 
adversary could cause a fire where accessible and use incendiary devices and flammable 
materials to propagate the fire across fire barriers.   
PRAs analyze random failures of SSCs and operators, and not malicious actions, 
thus cyber-attacks are not considered in PRA.  Target sets must consider cyber-attacks on 
any component susceptible to such an attack, consistent with 10 CFR 73.54, “Protection 
of digital computer and communication systems and networks” and RG 5.71, “Cyber 
Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities.” 
A site’s PRA provides many of the different equipment and component 
combinations found as the result of target set development, but several key differences do 
not allow the direct translation from PRA cut-sets to target sets.  These differences 
require that PRA and target sets exist as separate tools produced through separate 
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methods, but allow the use of PRA (in addition to other documents and analyses) to 
inform target sets. 
The Challenge of Target Sets 
Though the new regulation in 2009 was a codification of previous Security 
Orders, and by definition, Regulatory Guides are not requirements (they are the NRC 
staff’s example of an acceptable method to meet regulation), the new regulations in 10 
CFR 73.55(f) and issue of RG 5.81 communicate from the Staff that in order to meet 
regulation, a large effort from licensees is required to develop and maintain their target 
sets.   
10 CFR 73.55(f) requires that licensees: document and maintain the process to 
develop and identify target sets; consider cyber security in target sets; document those 
target set elements that are not located within a protected or vital area; and that changes 
to the plant are considered in target sets and accounted for in the protective strategy.  
These requirements are challenging for licensees to meet due to the voluminous and 
complex nature of nuclear plant safety analyses.  Development and management of target 
sets is done largely by hand using word processing and spreadsheet software.  Each 
change to the target sets must be manually entered and updated throughout the 
documentation.  Updating target sets to reflect site conditions or changes is open to delay, 
error, or accidental omission due to the onerous nature of updating every document.  
Though NRC and industry guidance exists, execution of target set development is left to 
the licensee with limited review, possibly exposing the target sets to accidental omission, 
errors, or obfuscation of data.  There are no computer programs specifically designed for 
target sets, and target sets differ from PRA enough such that current PRA codes have 
only limited usefulness for target sets.  
This report will outline the requirements for a computer code system (computer 
program) for the development and maintenance of target sets.  The proposed program 
would allow the populating and updating of target set data with commonly used nuclear 
industry safety data codes, provide a step by step process for users to add to and enrich 
entered data, provide multiple standard and user generated grouping and sorting options 
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for users to identify certain aspects of the target sets, and provide several report 
generating and data output paths.  This program would have applicability to US and 
international commercial, research and government reactor and nuclear facilities.  
Additionally, this program would apply to any complex facility or system that requires 
protection from sabotage and uses a fault-tree program.  The goal of the program would 
be to reduce costs associated with target set development and maintenance while 
providing a more accurate and insightful product for use in developing a facility’s 
protective strategy. 
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Chapter 2  
Program Description 
The primary purpose of the program is to guide users to use information that is 
already available as a part of their licensing basis to populate target set data within a 
database to allow easy editing, sorting and grouping.  The program would be a tool to be 
used in the development of target sets.  The program will populate target set data 
originally from PRA software, such as SAPHIRE and CAFTA cut set data sheets.  
Additional information will need to be entered manually from other data sources (e.g. 
safe shutdown list) either for each individual component or by a grouped set of 
components.  By using results and analyses from previously reviewed and verified safety 
analyses to form the target sets, the most accurate and thorough representation of the 
reactor systems can be used to inform the protective strategy.  After the population of 
several different component parameters (component type, location, system, etc…), 
sorting and grouping of the target set components would be accomplished by several 
standard and user-defined options.  The program will have the ability to mark some target 
elements (through the sorting and filtering options) as unavailable, to represent systems, 
trains or equipment in maintenance, outage, or under special circumstance, and the 
updated target sets that result from the change.  The program would have several standard 
and custom user generated reports for printing or exportation.  The program is intended 
as a unique tool to use in the development and continued maintenance of target sets. 
 
Target Set Development Process 
Outlined in RG 5.81, the target set development process seeks to provide steps for 
the identification and development of target sets: 1. Establish Target Set Analysis Team, 
2. Determine Objectives, 3. Identify Target Elements, 4. Generate Target Sets, and 5. 
Screen for Achievable Targets. 
Step 1 of the target set analysis (TSA) process is to form a team of individuals 
knowledgeable in: reactor engineering, plant systems and design, plant operations, 
structural design, PRA, physical security, cyber security, and maintenance.  Team 
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expertise in these areas would provide the individual knowledge and experience to inform 
the development of target sets. 
Step 2 of the TSA is to determine the objective of the analysis.  For a nuclear 
power plant, prevention of significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage are the primary 
objectives.  Lesser objectives could include redundant safety system availability, or 
mitigating and containment system availability (though not required for TSA).   
Step 3 of the TSA process is identification of target elements.  Target elements 
can be determined from examination of existing safety-related equipment lists and system 
descriptions.  Equipment in the PRA would also likely be included as target elements.  
The goal of target element identification is to include in the TSA those SSCs that have a 
safety basis or purpose to the plant.  The inclusion in target sets of non-safety related 
SSCs provides a greater safety defense-in-depth against adversary attack.  
Step 4 of the TSA process is target set generation, the identification of equipment 
combinations that lead to core damage.  A PRA could provide many of the equipment 
combinations required for target sets, but additional SSCs, operator actions, and 
combinations would be required beyond the PRA to accomplish this step. 
Step 5 of the TSA is to screen the target sets for achievable targets.  Some targets 
may be beyond the capabilities of the adversary, and thus need not be included for 
consideration in target sets.  The characteristics of the adversary are found in RG 5.69. 
The intention of the proposed computer program would be to assist in steps 3 and 
4 by using PRA to populate the target elements and SSC combinations in target sets.  
Consistent with step 3 and 4, additional information from many additional sources is 
required to be entered by the user to complete the target sets.  The computer program 
would provide a large basis via the importation of PRA data, and flexible framework to 
continue development of target sets with the inclusion of other user-entered data such as: 
equipment types, locations, systems, flood, fire and cyber-attack susceptibility, and 
additional SSCs not found in the PRA.  The computer program would provide the proper 
functionality and reporting options required by target set development and maintenance 
and not offered in other existing programs.   
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Program Method of Use 
The program is designed to be used within the TSA framework given in RG 5.81.  
Documentation that accompanies the program would provide a step-by-step process on 
the use of the program to develop and update target sets.  The process for the creation of 
new target sets in the program is shown below: 
 
1. Acquire Basis Documents 
2. Import cut sets from PRA data file 
3. Complete target element and target set data 
4. Add or delete target elements and target sets 
5. Group/mask target elements 
6. Create challenge scenarios 
7. Review of target set development 
8. Report target set insights 
 
The attributes of each step will be described in the following sections, and 
examples are given in Chapter 4 of this document. 
 
Program Architecture 
The program will be a database with a graphical user interface.  The program will 
be password protected with encrypted data files for additional security, and will be 
designed to be used on a stand-alone machine or network in accordance with regulations 
on the protection of Safeguards Information and National Security Information.  The 
program will have the ability to have several user profiles that access only the program 
data permitted to each user (data sharing between profiles will be non-simultaneous, and 
will be allowed though mutual authentication with the ability to revoke).  By default, user 
profiles will be fully accessible only by the owner of the user profile and the program 
administrator.  The program will log all access, files exported or printed, and changes for 
lengths of time determined by the administrator.   The program will use temporary files 
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while open, and auto-save to the original files at predesignated points or at user request 
(to prevent corruption of the saved data should a fault or error occur).   
The program will have two “frames.”  The “build frame” is where the user will 
build and modify the target sets and target elements (target sets are comprised of target 
elements).  The “challenge frame” is where the user can build scenarios that challenge the 
plant.  In the “challenge frame,” no permanent editing or changes to the target sets or 
target elements will be possible, but challenge scenarios could be designed and saved, 
and would automatically update when the data is edited and saved in the “build frame.”  
The system administrator or data owner will decide if users will have access to the “build 
frame,” “challenge frame,” or both. 
 
Target Set Basis Documents 
Though the program is built around using cut sets from a PRA program, 
additional information is required to populate the information fields in the data files and 
add target elements and sets that are not represented in the site’s PRA.  The program 
would provide specific guidance to documents and tables that should be included in the 
development of target sets.  RG 5.81 provides guidance on the types of documents and 
tables that the NRC Staff would expect to be reviewed and used in the development of 
target sets (this information is not given here as some is deemed Official Use Only – 
Security Related Information).  To facilitate the use of these documents, the program 
would provide a Bibliography Table feature that would allow the entry of document 
names, tables, and figures that possess the information referenced for the creation of 
target sets.  Additionally, under each bibliographic entry, a separate field would be 
available to enter what information was excluded and an explanation to the omission.  
This function exists to provide transparency and traceability to the target set development 
process, so the disposition of systems, structures, and components deemed important in 
the facility safety analysis can be determined for the development of target sets. 
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Importing PRA Files 
In the “build frame,” the program will give the option to import a document of 
PRA cut sets in either the SAPHIRE or CAFTA format, as these are the codes primarily 
used in the commercial nuclear industry.  The capability will exist to add additional PRA 
formats at a later time to encompass other risk assessment software.  After the user 
selects the PRA program file for import, the program will automatically begin populating 
target set and target element data files in the database with each cut set and cut set 
component.  Each cut set, upon transformation to a target set, would have a unique 
identification number assigned.  Each target element derived from cut sets would be 
automatically assigned a unique ID number and name (derived from cut set component 
name).  Duplicate cut sets will be ignored, and only unique cut sets will be captured as 
target sets.  Duplicate target element entries will also be ignored except for logging their 
associated cut sets.  The result of importing the PRA cut sets is to capture those 
relationships and form preliminary target sets.   
The program will also have the capability to update with a new import of a PRA 
cut set document in the same way the initial data import function occurred, by checking 
and ignoring duplicates.  In this way, updates to a site’s PRA could be reflected within 
the site’s target sets via an automatic process. 
 
Target Set and Target Element Data Files 
As the result of importing data from a PRA cut set data file, the program will have 
initial target set and target element data files populated.  The target set data files will 
have: their identifying ID #, and the full set of target elements imported from the PRA cut 
set data file.  The target elements will have: their identifying ID #; their identifying name; 
and the full list of target set ID#s to which that target element belongs.  The target 
element and target set “ID#s” are unique identifiers assigned by the program upon 
creation of the data file.   
In the “build frame,” if no PRA cut set data file is imported, or there are 
additional target sets or target elements to add, the user can create a new target element 
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and enter all values manually.  The user can then form target sets from the existing target 
elements. 
Target element data files would contain the information fields listed in Table 1, 
column 1 and the target set data files would contain the information fields listed in Table 
1, column 2.  From the PRA import step, those fields that are underlined in Table 1 would 
be filled automatically.  The remaining fields require that the user enter the data.  
In the “build frame,” the target elements can be displayed in the “Element Build 
List” and the target sets in the “Set Build List.”  The “Build Lists” could be filtered, 
sorted, and searched.  The lists will have columns for attributes of target elements and 
target sets, and will be edited individually or in user selected groups.  In this way, the 
data associated with many target elements and target sets will be able to be populated in a 
fast and efficient manner.  The standard column headers for the target element and target 
set lists are located in bold in Table 1 column 1 and column 2 (respectively). 
 
 








 Type # Elements 












Descriptions of the data file fields are: 
- “IDName” field would be automatically be derived during import from cut 
set files, entered by the user, or edited by the user.   
- “Type” field would be used to classify the type target element equipment, 
component or action with a standard library of terms (pipe, valve, 
switchgear, cable, etc…) or the option for user-defined terms.  This 
information would be useful to users to understand what type of component 
is represented (as it may not be obvious given the name of the target 
element).  The types listed will be links to the “Element Build List” with the 
list filtered to only those elements of the type selected. 
- “# Elements” field would compile the number of target elements that 
comprise the target set.  This information would be useful in sorting and 
filtering target sets.  Providing the target sets with the fewest targets may 
provide a useful insight for the protective strategy.   
- “Location” field would be user defined, but would identify the component 
location (room) within the site.  The “# Locations” field would display the 
compiled number of distinct locations of target elements from that target set.  
Providing the target sets with the fewest locations may provide a useful 
insight for the protective strategy.  The locations listed will be links to the 
“Element Build List” with the list filtered to only those elements contained 
within the location selected. 
- “Mode” and “Modes” fields would list the modes of reactor operation that 
the target element and target set are applicable to.  Target sets are required 
to represent all modes of operation.  A specific reactor’s modes of operation 
are defined in a site’s Technical Specifications.  Generic modes of 
operation, numbered 1-7 are as follows: Power Operation, Startup, Hot 
Standby, Cold Standby, Shutdown, Refueling, and Reduced Inventory 
Conditions. (RG 5.81) 
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- “Train” field would list the designated train that the target element belongs 
to.  The “Train(s)” field would display the compiled trains associated with 
that target set.  This information would be useful to understand the target 
sets when trains are taken out of service for maintenance.  The trains listed 
will be links to the “Element Build List” with the list filtered to only those 
elements contained within the train selected. 
- “System” field would list the associated system that the target element 
belongs to.  The “Systems” field would display the compiled systems 
associated with that target set.  This information would be useful to 
understand the target sets when systems are taken out of service for 
maintenance.  The systems listed will be links to the “Element Build List” 
with the list filtered to only those elements contained within the system 
selected. 
- The “Cyber?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element is 
susceptible to a cyber-attack (consistent with the guidance in NRC RG 5.71, 
“Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities”).  The “Cyber?” field for 
the target set data field would compile and display the fraction of target 
elements that are susceptible to a cyber-attack. 
- The “Flood?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element is 
susceptible to damage from flooding.  The “Flood?” field for the target set 
data field would compile and display the fraction of target elements that are 
susceptible to flooding.   
- The “Fire?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element is 
susceptible to damage from fire.  The “fire?” field for the target set data 
field would compile and display the fraction of target elements that are 
susceptible to fire. 
- The “Operator?” field would indicate “Yes” or “No” if the target element or 
target set requires an operator action outside the main control room for its 
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success or “No”.  For target sets, the “Operator?” field would sum the 
required operator actions of the target set.   
- The “Target Set” field for the target element data file would list every target 
set ID# (as links to the target set data files) that the target element is 
contained within.  The target sets listed would be links to the data file of the 
selected target set. 
 
The program will have the capability of adding user-created and defined fields for 
the target elements and target set data files.  These custom fields could also be added to 
the “Element Build List” and “Set Build List” for custom user-defined parameters for 
sorting. 
The program will have a copy/paste window for target sets and target elements.  
Copied target sets and elements that are then pasted would have placeholder names and 
new ID#s, so that expansion of the target sets and target elements can occur based on 
selected existing data.  For example, if a target set contained 5 elements, and the user 
wanted to make a new target set with 4 elements being the same and one new element, 
then the original set could be copied, the 5 elements would remain in the new target set 
while in the copy/paste window.  The undesired element would then be removed, and a 
new target element would then be added.  The target element list would then not be 
updated with the new 5
th
 element until the copied target set was “published,” and the 
copy/paste window exited.  
The “build frame” would have standard reporting and printing options, using the 
“Element Build List” and “Set Build List” to filter, sort, and search those target elements 
and target sets for reports and printing.  The intention of the “build frame” printing would 
be for target set development and maintenance purposes. 
 
Challenge Frame 
The “challenge frame” of the program is where the useful insights should be 
determined to inform the protective strategy.  The intention of separating the “build 
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frame” from the “challenge frame” is multifaceted.  First, the “challenge frame” would 
not allow users to edit the base data of the program.  This would provide a safe space for 
users to design different scenarios of equipment availability without the worry of 
compromising the base data.  Second, it provides for information compartmentalization.  
It may be that the users that build the target sets do not need to know the details on the 
Design Basis Threat and other threat characteristics that are used to challenge a plant.  
Third, the “challenge window” will have functionality that would impede the target set 
development.  In the “challenge frame,” filtering, grouping, and masking (replacing 
values with a placeholder) of elements could be saved.  In the “build frame,” filtering, 
sorting, and grouping would be for the session only, and also could be reset by the user 
during a session.   
The “challenge frame” will have the ability for the user to filter, sort and mask 
data in order to derive useful conclusions from the data.  The “Element Build List” and 
“Set Build List” are replaced with the “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List” 
and retain the bold columns from Table 20 (in the Appendix) as well as the capacity for 
custom user generated fields.  The “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List” could 
be filtered and sorted, and the results saved so different scenarios could be modeled.  In 
this way, the target sets could easily model scenarios like: having a train out of service; 
reactor in cold stand-by mode; refueling outage; or other planned maintenance.  Target 
elements could also be masked to simplify the target sets.  For example, all target 
elements in the control room could be masked as “control room” to act as a single target.  
The mask on the target elements would possess a data file like the target elements and 
target sets, and would display the same information as target elements with the addition 
of a list of all target elements it masks. 
The “challenge frame” will have standard and custom user-generated reporting 
and printing options.  The standard reports would detail information such as: the smallest 
target sets; the target sets with the fewest locations; the target sets with the largest cyber 
vulnerability (highest % of target elements that have cyber vulnerability); the target sets 
with the largest flood vulnerability; the target sets with the largest fire vulnerability; and 
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the target sets that rely on operator action outside the main control room.  The user could 
also use the “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List” to develop and save custom 
reporting options. 
 
Validation and Review 
Initial validation of the computer code would be accomplished through the use of 
a prepared standard cutset data file and instructions for the user.  The user would 
complete the example to test all of the code components, and the resulting target sets 
could then be compared against published results.  The validation materials would 
include documentation on variations in the results, and likely sources for deviation from 
the correct results.  
User, peer, and regulatory review of the target sets would be possible through the 
previously described reporting options (of individual or groups of target elements and 
target sets, or of all target set data).  Review of the documents and comments contained 
within the program’s Bibliographic Table would provide the basis for inclusion or 
exclusion of SSCs, which could then be traced to the target elements and target sets. 
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Chapter 3  
Method of Demonstration 
To illustrate the benefits of a program as described above, a small demonstration 
of the method can be performed without the large scope of producing the actual computer 
code program.  To demonstrate the methods of the program, a PRA is required.  For 
greater clarity, a PRA is constructed with simplified reactor systems and system 
interdependencies.  
 
Nuclear Power Facility Model 
For the reactor model, a Pressurized Power Reactor (PWR) is selected as they are 
the most numerous commercial reactor design used today.  The design is roughly based 
on the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) four-loop PWR, however, the design is 
simplified such that creation of target sets does not approach a realistic representation of 
any former, current or future commercial nuclear reactor, nor would the information be 
useful to an adversary, and thus does not constitute information that should be withheld 
from public viewing.  The model reactor is named the Simplified Generic Nuclear Plant 
(SGNP). 
The SGNP reactor model is simplified from the Westinghouse four-coolant loop 
PWR to a two loop PWR with two safety trains.  Using the system descriptions and 
diagrams in the WEC document, “The Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Nuclear 
Power Plant,” a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) was created to represent the 
reactor facility.  This P&ID can be found in the Appendix as Figure 2 and shows the 
primary coolant systems: the reactor coolant system (RCS), main steam supply system 
(MSSS), the emergency feedwater system (EFW), the high head safety injection (HHSI) 
system, and the residual heat removal (RHR) system.   
The location of equipment is only specified to the building as a simplification 
from individually locked rooms on separate levels of a building.  It is assumed that each 
building is separated by a locked flood and fire barrier. 
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Using the system descriptions, system interdependencies are determined and 
captured in Table 2.  Basic representations of the support systems are modeled for the 
SGNP. 
 
Table 2: System Interdependencies 







RCS x x 
  RHR x x 
  HHSI x x 
  EDGs 
  
x 
 CCW x 
 
x 
 EFW x 
 
x 
 Service Water 
   
x 
Condensers 




The primary coolant systems rely on the emergency diesel generators (EDGs), the 
component cooling water (CCW) system, the service water system, and the circulating 
water system.  The system dependencies are simplified for ease of use (to one or two 
items), as actual nuclear power facilities have much greater redundancies and 
interdependent relationships between systems.   
The chemical and volume control system (CVCS), which provides boration and 
can partially contribute makeup water, is not included in the model.  Though the 
pressurizer is included in the P&ID, the pressurizer and the associated pressure operated 
relief valve are not modeled for reactor coolant inventory modeling simplification.  As 
the CVCS cannot contribute water to the reactor coolant system at a rate to meet safety 
requirements for a LOCA, boration was not considered, and the pressurizer was not 
considered, the CVCS is determined to be unnecessary to model. 
The power systems modeled are the EDGs, the switchyard, and offsite power.  
These components are selected to simplify target locations and electrical system 
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component and to demonstrate some simple system dependencies and redundancies for 
the electrical systems.  Offsite power and EDGs are the primary load bearing safety 
electrical systems, and both route through the common switchyard.  Switchgear, class 1E 
batteries, and non-safety electrical systems were not modeled, and this assumption does 
not pose any negative impact on the model.  These components are omitted from the 
model as their locations are numerous and they also support separate trains and systems, 
which would complicate the reactor model. 
The reactor protection system (RPS) (plant safety computer), instrumentation and 
control systems, and reactor reactivity systems (control rods and boration) are not 
modeled, but a successful control rod insertion is assumed when needed (consistent with 
reactivity control requirements).  Though the RPS would likely be the primary target for 
a cyber-attack, plant instrumentation and control systems are too numerous to model for 
this example.  It is assumed that a reactor trip initiates automatically or manually and 
successfully signals equipment to actuate.   
Operator actions are not modeled for the PRA, but the possibility of operator 
action was left as an option with the manually controlled steam line A and B condenser 
and atmospheric dump valves.  
Other plant systems that are not modeled, but were assumed to have no negative 
effects on plant performance were: containment isolation valves, heating ventilations and 
cooling systems (HVAC), containment spray systems, check valves, and the spent fuel 
pool and associated systems.   Containment isolation, HVAC, and containment spray 
systems are omitted as these systems are typically excluded from target set analysis, and 
thus would provide little benefit for this demonstration.  Check valves are excluded for 
simplicity of the model design.  The spent fuel pool is not considered as the complexities 
of the reactor systems provide a better example for the demonstration of the program 
methods. 
The reactor modeled is assumed to be at full power operation, with no equipment 
out of service.  Though other reactor modes can rely on fewer pieces of equipment to 
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cool the reactor, full-power operation is chosen as it challenges more systems of the plant 
for the demonstration.  
 
PRA Model of the SGNP 
From the Figure 2 P&ID found in the appendix, system dependencies in Table 2, 
and system descriptions found in WEC documentation, the initiating events, event trees 
and fault trees for the PRA are formed for the SGNP using the SAPHIRE 7 PRA code.   
Five initiating events are explored for the SGNP: steam line break in loop A (SL-
A-Break), steam line break in loop B (SL-B-Break), RPS trip (RPS-TRIP), small break 
loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) in the RCS (reactor coolant system) (RCS-
SBLOCA), and large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) in the RCS (RCS-
LBLOCA).  These initiating events represent common challenges to the reactor operation 
that pose significant challenges. 
The SL-A-Break and SL-B-Break initiating events are similar but occur in 
opposite secondary cooling loops between the steam generators and turbines.  These 
initiating events challenge the plant by the loss of secondary coolant loop inventory, and 
thus there is greater reliance on the opposing secondary cooling loop or shutdown and 
cooling systems. 
The RPS-TRIP event represented the actuation of shutdown systems of the 
reactor.  The RPS-TRIP initiating event challenges the ability to remove heat from the 
primary coolant loop through the use the secondary coolant systems, and not through the 
injection of cool water from the safety injection systems.  The RPS-TRIP event was 
assumed to be bounding for LOOP, turbine trip, and reactor coolant pump trip, as they 
would result in a RPS-initiated trip.  LOOP and loss of steam loop functionality are found 
within the fault trees of the events of the RPS-TRIP initiating event.   
The RCS-SBLOCA initiating event challenges the plant to cool the reactor with at 
least one safety injection system.  The RCS-LBLOCA initiating event challenges the 
plant to cool the reactor with the minimum of at least one accumulator and one high-head 
safety injection system.  The LOCA initiating events are standard events that challenge 
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the plant to cool the reactor by keeping enough cool water to flow through the reactor by 
the use of the safety injection and RHR systems. 
For each initiating event, event trees were created that represented the major 
coolant systems required to function in response to each initiating event.  The results of 
reactor “OK” status and core damage “CD” are determined by the event trees.  The “OK” 
status denotes a safe final reactor conditions, and the “CD” status indicates the failure of 
safety systems that result in core damage.  Figure 3 through Figure 7 (in the appendix) 
show the event trees modeled for the SGNP.   
The SGNP event tree models are simplified by having only two possibilities: 
“Actuates” and “Fails.”  “Actuates” is taken to mean that the action / component / system 
occurs/operates as desired and at a sufficient level.  “Fails” is taken to mean that the 
action / component / system does not meet the required level of action by either inaction, 
undesired action, or insufficient action. 
Failure of the events in the event trees are determined by their associated fault 
trees.  Figure 8 through Figure 23 (in the appendix) illustrate the fault trees for the SGNP.  
The fault trees differ from most internal event PRAs as they consider the failure of 
passive components (pipes and tanks), and not just the failure of active components 
(valves, pumps, etc…).  Each fault tree was formed from understanding the SSCs of each 
system, and the systems they rely upon.  The success criteria for the PRA was the 
successful cooling of the reactor core to cold standby (through Mode 4 to achieve Mode 
5, Shutdown), when the RHR system is required to cool the reactor, due to low 
temperature and pressure.  As the RHR system would be required to run for decay heat 
removal, this success criteria would challenge the major cooling systems of the reactor 
facility. 
The failure combinations given by the fault trees and events in the event trees give 
the cut sets for the SGNP.  For the purposes of this demonstration failure probabilities 
were not considered, so what remains are all possible failure paths to core damage for the 
SGNP, 169,115 different cut sets, with the largest cut sets having 10 different 
components.  As this number of cut sets is unwieldy, ten cut sets were selected to use for 
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demonstration, six with RPS trip as the initiating event, two with a steam line break in 
loop A as the initiating event, and two with a LBLOCA as the initiating event.  These ten 
cut sets are shown in Figure 1, in the report format from the SAPHIRE 7 PRA program. 
As a note: the model of the reactor and systems in the PRA applies only to the 
simulated reactor facility and do not approach the complexity and redundancy of an 
actual nuclear reactor design.  The descriptions provided for the cut sets apply to the 
model only, and are not intended to provide an account of actual reactor system, 




Figure 1: Selected PRA Cut Sets 
 
END STATE CUT SETS REPORT  
Project: SGNP                      Case : Current 
Analysis: RANDOM                    Units: Per Year 
End State Cut Set # Events Count Inputs 
CD 7 2 RPS-TRIP, CCW-COMP-FAIL 
14 3 RCS-LBLOCA, ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-A, ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B 
30 3 RCS-LBLOCA, HHSI-A-PUMP-UNIT-FAIL, HHSI-B-PUMP-UNIT-FAIL 
201 3 RPS-TRIP, RHR-A-HX-UNIT-FAIL, RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL 
710 4 RPS-TRIP, EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS, EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS, LOOP 
928 4 SL-A-BREAK, CCW-COMP-FAIL, COND-B-FAIL, EFW-A-MP-FAIL 
1360 5 RPS-TRIP, FW-A-MP-FAIL, FW-B-MP-FAIL, VT2A-Fail, VT2B-Fail 
3062 RPS-TRIP, COND-A-FAIL, COND-B-FAIL, EFW-A-MP-FAIL, EFW-A-SP-FAIL, VT2B-Fail 
3666 6 RPS-TRIP, EFW-A-MP-FAIL, EFW-A-SP-FAIL, FW-A-MP-FAIL, FW-B-MP-FAIL, VT2B-
FAIL 
9757 6 SL-A-BREAK, SWITCHYARD-FAIL, VE2A-FAIL, VE3A-FAIL, VS2A-FAIL, VS2B-FAIL 
2014/08/02 Page # 19:01:01 
 Model Rev. ----/--/-- 
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Cut set 7 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the 
reactor and the failure of the CCW system.  This cut set led to core damage as upon RPS 
trip, safety systems are required to bring the reactor to a shutdown state.  The component 
cooling water system provides the cooling to systems required to control the reactor.  
Without the proper cooling, these systems fail, stopping the cooling systems to the 
reactor, and leading to core damage. 
Cut set 14 consists of a large break in the reactor coolant system, and failures of 
both of the accumulator injections lines.  Upon a large break loss of coolant accident, 
additional water inventory is required to be added to the reactor coolant system to cool 
the reactor.  This coolant is injected into the cold leg of the RCS through the accumulator 
injection lines.  If the accumulator injection lines fail, there is no other method of 
providing additional coolant into the reactor vessel, and thus leads to core damage. 
Cut set 30 consists of a large break in the reactor coolant system and failures of 
both high head safety injection pumps.  As a large break loss of coolant accident results 
in a large amount of coolant inventory being relocated to the floor of the containment 
building during full-power operation, a large volume of coolant is required to replace it in 
a short time span.  As such, the injection of at least one accumulator and one high head 
safety injection pump is required to provide the coolant inventory until the reactor cools 
enough for the residual heat removal system to take over the coolant inventory 
circulatory function.  The loss of both high head safety injection pumps prevents the 
required water inventory from entering the reactor core, and thus leads to core damage. 
Cut set 201 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the 
reactor and failures of both residual heat removal heat exchangers.  Upon RPS trip, 
control rods insert and reduce the reactor reactivity and cooling systems reduce the 
reactor coolant temperature.  When the reactor coolant temperature is low enough, long-
term cooling is facilitated by the residual heat removal systems, of which at least one is 
required.  In this cut set, the loss of both RHR heat exchanges leads to no heat removal 
from the reactor coolant system and thus core damage. 
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Cut set 710 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the 
reactor, loss of both emergency diesel generators, and a loss of offsite power.  In order 
for safety systems to bring the reactor to shut down and continue removal of decay heat, 
electrical power is required to run instrumentation and control equipment, (most) valves, 
and pumps.  The loss of offsite power means no electricity is reaching the site to power 
equipment, and thus the use of on-site emergency diesel generators is required to provide 
power to plant equipment.  The loss of offsite power and the emergency diesel generators 
leads to core damage as there is no electricity to monitor the reactor or systems or to run 
any equipment to cool the reactor. 
Cut set 928 consists of a break in the steam or feedwater line of loop A, loss of 
component cooling water, loss of condenser B, and loss of motor-driven emergency 
feedwater pump A.  For the model, the reactor can safely reach shutdown with one 
operational steam line without the use of emergency equipment.  In this cutset, steam line 
A experiences a break, but makeup water cannot be added to steam loop A as the motor 
driven pump of the emergency feedwater system has failed (and the steam driven pump is 
unavailable in a steam line break in the same train).  Steam loop B loses cooling function 
as condenser B fails.  Steam is then dumped to the atmosphere in steam loop B to cool 
the reactor by way of a natural convective current within the RCS.  The loss of 
component cooling water incapacitates the residual heat removal system, meaning when 
the reactor coolant cools below the capabilities of steam loop B, the natural convection 
within the reactor coolant system slows and stops and leads to core damage.   
Cut set 1360 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the 
reactor, loss of feedwater pumps A and B, and failure of valves VT2A and VT2B for 
steam dump to the atmosphere.  Upon reactor trip, the turbines are tripped as well, 
removing their heat removal function.  The loss of feedwater pumps A and B removes the 
ability to dump steam to condensers to remove heat.  The failure (closing) of valves 
VT2A and VT2B closes the pathway for the steam dump to the atmosphere.  With the 
steam/feedwater loops unable to remove heat with the condensers or through steam 
dump, no heat is removed from the reactor coolant system, resulting in core damage. 
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Cut set 3062 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the 
reactor, loss of condensers A and B, loss of motor driven emergency feedwater pump A, 
loss of steam driven emergency feedwater pump A, and failure of valve VT2B for steam 
dump to the atmosphere.  Upon reactor trip, the turbines are tripped as well, removing 
their heat removal function.  The failure of the condensers to function requires that heat 
be removed from the core via dumping steam to the atmosphere.  Failure of both the 
motor-driven and steam-driven emergency feedwater pumps in loop A prevents any 
makeup water being added to the loop and the loss of heat removal functions of that loop.  
The failure (closing) of valve VT2B closes the pathway for the steam dump to the 
atmosphere for loop B.  The loss of makeup water for steam dump in loop A, and closing 
of the pathway for steam dump in loop B results in no heat removal functions large 
enough to cool the reactor core, and thus core damage. 
Cut set 3666 consists of a trip of the reactor protection system to shut down the 
reactor, loss of motor driven emergency feedwater pump A, loss of steam-driven 
emergency feedwater pump A, loss of feedwater pumps A and B, and failure of valve 
VT2B for steam dump to the atmosphere.  Upon reactor trip, the turbines are tripped as 
well, removing their heat removal function.  The failure of both feedwater pumps 
removes any ability to cool the turbine/feedwater loop with the condensers.  The loss of 
both the motor-driven and steam-driven emergency feedwater pumps in loop A prevents 
any makeup water being added to the loop and the loss of heat removal functions of that 
loop.  The failure (closing) of valve VT2B closes the pathway for the steam dump to the 
atmosphere for loop B.  The loss of makeup water for steam dump in loop A, and no 
pathway for steam dump in loop B results in no heat removal functions large enough to 
cool the reactor core, and thus core damage. 
Cut set 9757 consists of a break in the steam or feedwater line of loop A, failure 
of the switchyard, and the failure of valves VE2A, VE3A, VS2A, and VS2B.  This cutset 
demonstrates a partial success to cool the reactor.  In this cutset, steam line A experiences 
a break, but due to failure of the switchyard, turbine B trips as well, removing that heat 
removal option.  Though valves VE2A and VE3A fail, the motor operated emergency 
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feedwater pump functions through operational valve VE1A, cooling the reactor coolant to 
the point where the RHR system can take over cooling functions.  This cutset leads to 
core damage due to the failure of valves VS2A and VS2B, which prevent the RHR 
system from providing a circulating current and cooling to the reactor coolant system.   
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Chapter 4  
Program Demonstration 
The resulting cut sets from the PRA represent the failure combinations due to 
random failures of equipment considered in the PRA.  The program uploads this data 
from the PRA to use as a starting point for the development of target sets.  The addition 
of data from other sources populates data fields that allow for the efficient sorting and 
grouping of target elements and target sets. 
 
Build Frame 
Figure 1 is the cut set data file received from the SAPHIRE PRA model of the 
SGNP.  The program imports this SAPHIRE PRA cut sets, and populates data files for 
the target sets and target elements.  For example, Table 3 and Table 4are examples of 
what the resulting data files would look like for a target element and a target set after 
importing cut set 928 from Figure 1.   
 
 
Table 3: Target Element #7.02 Data File after import 














 Target Sets 7, 928 
* Data File Parameters are described after Table 1 
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Table 4: Target Set #928 Data File after import 
Target Set Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# 928 









 Elements: 7.02, 928.01, 928.02, 928.03 
* Data File Parameters are described after Table 1 
 
 
Table 19Error! Reference source not found. (in the appendix) shows the 
“Element Build List” after importing from the PRA data file.  The occupied fields are 
those that would be filled automatically by the program upon PRA data file import.  The 
empty fields need to be filled by the user. 
The program takes the cutset data from the PRA to create most of the failure 
combinations found in the target sets.  It is up to the user to add to or remove from the 
imported data to complete the target sets.  After importing data from the PRA data file, 
the remaining information is entered manually due to the non-standard nature of the 
documents, figures, and tables that should be used to complete the data entry for the 
target elements and target sets.  The additional information is required to be entered to 
provide the level of detail necessary to determine the insights desired of the target set 
development process.  This additional information is required for target set development 
if a user has the program or not, but the program has means to expedite and replicate the 
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data entry, and update with new data when plant changes occur.  In this way, the entry of 
this data needs to occur once, and then be maintained for the life of the design. 
The program provides a means to catalog and comment upon the documents 
required to provide the additional information beyond what is found in the PRA.  Table 5 
lists the bibliographic entries for the source documents used to fill in the remaining 
information fields for the SGNP target elements and target sets.  The documents listed in 
Table 5 are some of the dozens that would need to be consulted to complete target sets. 
Site PRAs would document different failure combinations that lead to different 
undesirable consequences (e.g. core damage and/or radionuclide release) and most of the 
safety related SSCs.  Documentation related to the development of the PRAs would 
outline system dependencies, success criteria, and criteria for component inclusion in the 
PRA. 
The site Safe Shutdown list would document those SSCs required to affect and 
maintain reactor shutdown consistent with 10 CFR Part 50.  Class 1E equipment is 
defined as safety-related electrical equipment, consistent with The Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 323-1974, “IEEE Standard for 
Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.”  Seismic 
Category I SSCs are to be designed to withstand seismic events consistent with RG 1.29, 
“Seismic Design Classification.”  P&IDs illustrate system design and connections in a 
graphical manner.  Review of P&IDs and system walk downs may reveal equipment or 
structures omitted from PRA activities.  System Description documents would outline 
and detail required and expected operating conditions of systems and equipment 
performance.   ite procedures and training manuals would provide details on those 
operator actions accounted for in the site safety analysis.  Further understanding of 
operator actions would be required for target set development. The Cyber Security Plan 
and Critical Digital Asset (CDA) List would detail the analyses conducted to determine 
CDAs, and provide additional information on cyber security vulnerabilities not 
considered in the PRA. 
.  
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Table 5: SGNP Bibliographic Table 
Document Omission from target sets 
SGNP Level 1 PRA 5/3/14  
SGNP Level 1 PRA development report 
rev. 5  
Safe Shut Down List rev. 45  
Vital Equipment List rev. 11 Containment venting and filtering systems do 
not meet the definition of TS equipment 
Class 1E electrical power systems Containment venting and filtering systems do 
not meet the definition of TS equipment 
Seismic Category I SSCs Containment venting and filtering systems do 
not meet the definition of TS equipment 
P&ID RCS  
RCS System Description and 
Requirements  
P&ID MSSS  
MSSS System Description and 
Requirements  
P&ID EFW  
EFW System Description and 
Requirements  
P&ID RHR  
RHR System Description and 
Requirements  
P&ID SIS  
SIS System Description and 
Requirements  
P&ID CCW  
CCW System Description and 
Requirements  
Site Procedures - Reactor Operator 
Actions 
Procedures for containment venting and 
filtering systems do not meet the definition of 
TS equipment 
Site Training Manual - Reactor Operator Training for containment venting and filtering 
systems do not meet the definition of TS 
equipment 
SGNP Cyber Security Plan  
SGNP Critical Digital Asset List CDAs that relate to containment venting and 
filtering systems do not meet the definition of 
TS equipment 
* SIS: Safety Injection System 
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Table 5 shows documents with SSCs omitted from target sets.  The definition of 
target set is more restrictive than safety-related or vital equipment, as it does not include 
the functions to mitigate or prevent any offsite releases after core damage or spent fuel 
sabotage.  Due to this difference, some systems and components would be expected on 
safety-related and vital equipment lists and not in the target sets.  Other omissions from 
the target sets from safety-related equipment lists would be documented in a similar 
manner to provide traceability on the inclusion and exclusion of equipment. 
Using the documents in Table 5, we fill in the empty information fields in the 
Target Element and Target Set Data Files.  Easy updating of data would be accomplished 
with the “Element Build List” through group selection and updating on the table.  Table 6 
and Table 7 show examples of data files after populating the information fields for target 
element 7.02 and target set 928. 
The population of data files with the new information provides the ability to sort 
and group target elements and target sets for more data entry.  Once all fields have been 
completed, the user can then identify start to develop insights. 
 
Table 6: Target Element #7.02 Data File with Complete Information Fields 




Name Comp. Cool Water 









Target Sets 7, 928 
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Table 7: Target Set #928 Data File with Complete Information Fields 
Target Set Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# 928 
# Elements 4 
# Locations 3 
Modes MSSS A 
Train(s) MSSS B 





Elements: 7.02, 928.01, 928.02, 928.03 
 
 
After populating the information fields we find the complete “Set Build List” for 
the “build frame” in Table 8.   
 
Table 8: Set Build List in with Complete Information Fields 
ID# # elements # location Modes Train(s) Cyber? Flood? Fire? Operator? 
7 2 2 1,2,3,4 
 
1 0.5 1 0 
14 3 1 1,2,3,4,5,6 A, B 0.33 0 0.33 0 
30 3 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.66 0.66 1 0 
201 3 1 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.33 0.33 1 0 
710 4 2 1,2,3,4 
 
1 1 1 0 
928 4 3 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.5 0.25 1 0 
1360 5 1 1,2,3,4 A, B 1 1 1 2 
3062 6 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.83 0.83 1 1 
3666 6 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 1 1 1 1 
9757 6 4 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.83 0.83 1 0 
 
 
Table 8 shows several insights at this point.  Every target set with 3+ targets has a 
reduction in locations to fewer than the number of targets.  Most target sets apply to 
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conditions at power, and only one applies to shut down conditions.  Most target sets 
would be affected if a steam or safety train would be taken out of service.  There exists a 
possibility of whole target sets being susceptible to cyber-attack.  Several target sets are 
susceptible to flooding conditions.  Almost all target sets are very susceptible to fire.  
Cyber-attack, flooding and fire susceptibility are indicated by the fractional number of 
elements in the target set that are susceptible to those types of attacks.  Three target sets 
have operator actions outside the main control room associated with them.  Insights like 
these should be examined in the “challenge frame” as the target sets are not yet fully 
developed. 
The updated and complete “Element Build List” for the “Build Frame” is shown 
in Table 20 (in the appendix).  Some information fields in Table 20 remain empty as 
location or train designations may not apply, for example: the RPS-TRIP target element 
could be accomplished in many different locations by many different methods (Operator-
initiated in the main control room (MCR), remote shutdown workstation (RSWS), 
through manipulation of a sensor, through automatic initiation by the RPS after an 
adversary attack on plant safety systems occurs, or through onsite or offsite adversary 
action) and thus location information is inapplicable.  Similarly, the LOOP target element 
can be accomplished by an offsite adversary in locations not within the jurisdiction of the 
site security force, and thus location information is inapplicable.  Information on target 
element “train” would primarily serve a purpose in the “challenge frame” to update target 
sets when trains are taken out of service for maintenance.  Many systems, structures and 
components would not belong to a specific train. 
The PRA provides an excellent starting point for target sets, but the differences 
between PRA and target sets necessitates a review of system documentation to verify that 
the components imported from the PRA are appropriate for target sets, and to add target 
sets for components not found in the PRA.  RG 5.81 provides guidance on the use of 
PRA, additional documents, and clarification on some of the subtleties between PRA and 
target sets. 
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The creation of new data files is easiest when the PRA data has been fully 
uploaded and information fields have been completed, as the program can copy existing 
target elements for the purposes of creating new ones.  For example, to represent a design 
change at the SGNP of adding a valve to RHR loop A, before the RHR heat exchanger, 
we pick to copy target element 9757.04, RHR A injection line valve, an element of 
similar function and purpose.  Table 9 shows the data file for target element 9757.04.   
 
Table 9: Target Element #9757.04 Data File 




Name Rx Trip  









Target Sets 9757 
 
 
Upon choosing to copy target element 9757.04, a window would open with the 
fields shown in Table 10.   
The new target element is automatically assigned a new ID#, and the remaining 
fields are “grayed.”  The “grayed” text can be overwritten or removed, or if there is no 
change, the “grayed” text is what is written to the new data file.   
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Table 10: Copy of Target Element #9757.04 Data File 




Name Rx Trip  












The last information field is where the user can enter a synonymous target 
element.  The target element does not need to be the same type of component, but needs 
to be synonymous in the fault tree (the synonymous component is an “or” for the new 
component).  For this example, we could enter the valve we originally picked, target 
element 9757.04, or we could pick another element.  We pick the RHR A heat exchanger, 
target element 201.01, as the single failure of either would disable RHR system A.   
Upon selection of a synonymous target element and acceptance of the copy 
command, the program would create the new target element data file, as well as new 
target set files containing the new target element.  When the program understands that a 
target element is synonymous, it copies all target sets that the synonymous target element 
is in, and replaces the synonymous target element with the new one in the copied target 
sets.  For example, if we choose the RHR A heat exchanger, target element 201.01, the 
existing target set of our selection looks like Table 11.  
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The program would take all target sets that target element 201.01 is in (in our 
selection, that is only 201), and copy them to the new file to create the new synonymous 
target set.   
 
Table 11: Target Set #201 Data File 
Target Set Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# 201 
# Elements 3 
# Locations 1 
Modes 1,2,3,4 
Train(s) A,B 





Elements: 7.01, 201.01, 201.02 
 
 
Table 12 shows the new target set that is synonymous with Target Set 201 as the 
result of originally copying target element 201.01 and declaring the new target element 
synonymous with 201.01.   
For the creation of new target elements (and thus target sets), the program would 
be uniquely designed to expand on the information already provided.  The use of existing 
data allows the user to trace the basis for inclusion of new elements in the target sets, and 
allow ease of use in the maintenance of target sets as designs and procedures change on 
site. 
The traceability of the target sets to existing safety analyses is important as there 
are systems, structures, and components not included in a PRA, that would need to be 
included in target sets.  For example, SSCs that only passively fail under normal 
conditions are normally excluded from internal event PRAs, but as they could be targets 
40 
for an adversary, those SSCs need to be included in target sets.  Examples of passive 
SSCs that could be targets of an adversary are: water tanks, building structures, and flood 
and fire barriers.  
 
Table 12: Target Set #9758 Data File (synonymous to TS 201) 
Target Set Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# 9758 
# Elements 3 
# Locations 1 
Modes 1,2,3,4 
Train(s) A,B 





Elements: 7.01, 201.02, 9757.06 
 
 
Upon completion of target set development, the element build list and set build 
lists can be used to sort and filter target elements and target sets for report generation and 
printing.  The primary purpose of these reporting options would be for target set 
development and review.  
 
Challenge Frame 
The “challenge frame” of the program would start with data compiled in the 
“build frame” and provide additional options for sorting, grouping and editing.  For the 
challenge frame, the “Element Build List” and “Set Build List” would gain additional 
capabilities and become the “Target Element List” and the “Target Set List.”  The 
“challenge frame” would possess the capability to create and save different scenarios to 
replicate site conditions under which an adversary attack would be credible.  The 
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“challenge frame” is intended for grouping target sets and elements to replicate adversary 
attack goals and capabilities. 
Grouping target elements in the “challenge frame” is achieved by “masking.” 
Masking begins similarly to making a new target element in the “build frame.”  Masking 
different target elements seeks to simplify the target sets to commonly defended locations 
containing many targets.   
The main control room contains target elements for likely every target set, but it 
can be simplified to a single target.  Similarly, most equipment in reactor containment is 
simplified to a single target, due to the multitude of ways an adversary could cause core 
damage upon access.  For this example, we will simplify all target elements found in 
containment with a mask called “containment,” as shown in the mask data file in Table 
13.   
Mask 1 would replace all target elements listed on its data file within their target 
sets.  The answers for “Cyber?”, “Flood?”, “Fire?”, and “Operator?” give a conservative 
response.  If any element that is masked has a “Yes” answer, then the mask will too.   
 
Table 13: Mask 1 Data File 















Mask 1 shows a “No” for “Operator?” as all elements contained within the mask 
have a “No” for “Operator?”  The “Target Set List” would reflect the changes to the 
target sets, as shown by the highlighted target sets in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-
reference..   
 
Table 14: Target Set List with Mask 1 applied 
ID# # elements # location Modes Train(s) Cyber? Flood? Fire? Operator? 
7 2 2 1,2,3,4 
 
1 0.5 1 0 
14 1 1 1,2,3,4,5,6 A, B 1 1 1 0 
30 3 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.66 0.66 1 0 
201 3 1 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.33 0.33 1 0 
710 4 2 1,2,3,4 
 
1 1 1 0 
928 4 3 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.5 0.25 1 0 
1360 5 1 1,2,3,4 A, B 1 1 1 2 
3062 6 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.83 0.83 1 1 
3666 6 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 1 1 1 1 
9757 5 4 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.8 0.8 1 0 
 
 
The “Target Element List” would show Mask 1, the elements it replaced would 
not be shown unless the mask was removed.  Masked target elements are not altered or 
removed, but they are taken out of individual consideration for target sets within that save 
file, and thus can be verified to still be represented within the target sets for review and 
audit purposes.  
Masks could also be used to group collocated elements susceptible to a single 
action.  If we assumed that the steam-powered and motor-powered emergency feedwater 
pumps were collocated such that both could be destroyed or made inoperable at the same 
time with the same action, we could mask the elements to have the target sets better 
represent the conditions of the SGNP.   
Table 15 shows target set 3666 before masking target elements 928.03 and 
3062.02, the EFW A motor-operated and steam-operated pumps, into mask 2 (shown in  
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Table 16).  Mask 2 combines the EFW A pumps and provides an insight for the 
protective strategy (wherein redundant pieces of equipment are collocated thus rendering 
their safety system redundancy irrelevant to an adversary).   
 
Table 15: Target Set #3666 Data File 
Target Set Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# 3666 
# Elements 6 




RPS,EFW A, MSSS A, 






7.01, 928.03, 1360.01, 
1360.02, 1360.04, 3062.02 
 
 
Table 16: Mask 2 Data File 
Element Mask Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# M2 
Name EFW A pumps 








Elements: 928.03, 3062.02 
Table 17 shows target set 3666 with the mask applied, reducing the number of 
targets by one.   
 
Table 17: Target Set 3666 with Mask 2 applied 
Target Set Data File 
Attribute Value 
ID# 3666 
# Elements 5 
# Locations 2 
Modes 1,2,3,4 
Train(s) 1,2,3,4 
Systems RPS,EFW A, MSSS A, 









Masks added to the target sets will systematically reduce the number of targets 
and target sets, and although individual mask creation takes effort, the change takes effect 
through hundreds or thousands of target sets.  Representing these insights in a consistent, 
traceable, and automated manner allows the target sets to reflect site conditions and 
adversary tactics for a more robust product to inform the protective strategy. 
For the purposes of creating challenge scenarios, target elements can be selected 
as “out” to represent their unavailable, out of service, or destroyed state.  Target elements 
can be marked as “out” in either the “Target Element List” or in the individual target 
element data files.  The change would be reflected in the appropriate target sets.  For 
example, if we choose target element 928.03, the EFW A motor-operated pump, to be out 
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of service, we can see that the highlighted target sets in Table 18 are changed as a result 
of this equipment unavailability.  
Table 18: Target Set List with element 928.03 unavailable 
ID# # elements # location Modes Train(s) Cyber? Flood? Fire? Operator? 
7 2 2 1,2,3,4 
 
1 0.5 1 0 
14 3 1 1,2,3,4,5,6 A, B 0.33 0 0.33 0 
30 3 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.66 0.66 1 0 
201 3 1 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.33 0.33 1 0 
710 4 2 1,2,3,4 
 
1 1 1 0 
928 3 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.33 0 1 0 
1360 5 1 1,2,3,4 A, B 1 1 1 2 
3062 5 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.8 0.8 1 1 
3666 5 2 1,2,3,4 A, B 1 1 1 1 
9757 6 4 1,2,3,4 A, B 0.83 0.83 1 0 
 
 
The selecting of equipment as “out” may be saved under different scenarios files 
in the “challenge frame.”  The possibility of different save files allows for the automatic 
updating of many different scenarios when changes are made to the target sets.   
After masking, the target element list and target set list can be sorted and filtered 
to show the updated qualities of the target sets desired.  The sorts and filters could be 
saved to file, so when the target sets are updated, the insight sought would be updated as 
well and reflect the changes in the design.  Reports could be generated from the target 
sets, with options to print full lists of target elements and their associated parameters.  
Reporting options could be saved so they are updated upon updates to the target sets. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
The results of target set development are insights to inform the site protective 
strategy.  Using the program described, insights are easily determined for those target sets 
that: have the greatest flood/fire/cyber susceptibility, fewest target elements or target 
locations, have the greatest reliance on operator actions, are most affected by equipment 
maintenance and unavailability, have elements that are not contained within a vital or 
protected area, and are applicable to reactor modes of operations.  The highlighting of the 
most vulnerable target sets allows informed decisions to update and improve the site 
protective strategy.  The ability of the program to update target sets to plant configuration 
and design changes allows the security program to update protective measures closely in 
line with changes to plant safety systems and procedures.   
Though the concept of target sets has been in practice since the early 1990s, the 
maturation of the tool and guidance has been slow.  As a tool to inform a protective 
strategy, target sets wield great strength and flexibility, but currently are onerous and 
imprecise to develop and maintain.  The creation of a computer program to guide, 
expedite and automate target set development and maintenance would affect greater 
security at US commercial reactor facilities, as well as any other facility or system that 
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Figure 2: SGNP P&ID 
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Figure 10: EFWS-A Fault Tree 
EFWS-A


































































































EDG A fails to
operate
EDG B fails to
operate
EFW A steam





























































EDG A unit or
fuel fails
EDG B unit or
fuel fails
Failure of Circ Water
Sys to Supply SW
Failure of service
















 EFWS-A  -   Emergency Feed Water System A 2015/01/14 Page 2
59 
 













































































EDG A unit or
fuel fails




EDG A fails to
operate









































































































 EFWS-B  -   Emergency Feed Water System B 2015/02/02 Page 18
60 
 
Figure 12: EFWS-A-SLB Fault Tree 
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EDG A unit or
fuel fails
EDG B unit or
fuel fails
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Failure of turbine A 
or electrial load A
Failure of
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Failure of Turbine A 
to adequately
remove heat
Failure of condenser 
sys A to adequately
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EDG A unit or
fuel fails
EDG B unit or
fuel fails
EDG A fails to
operate






































Failure of Turbine B 
to adequately
remove heat
Failure of turbine B 
or electrial load B
Failure of condenser 
sys B to adequately
remove heat
Condenser System B 
Fails




















 SL-B  -   Steam Line B 2015/02/03 Page 10
72 
Table 19: Element Build List after import from PRA data file 
ID# IDName Name Type Location Modes Train System Cyber? Flood? Fire? Operator? Target Sets 
7.01 RPS-TRIP           
7, 201, 710, 1360, 
3062, 3666 
7.02 CCW-COMP-FAIL           7, 928 
14.01 RCS-LBLOCA           14, 30 
14.02 ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-A           14 
14.03 ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B           14 
30.01 
HHSI-A-PUMP-UNIT-
FAIL           30 
30.02 
HHSI-B-PUMP-UNIT-
FAIL           30 
201.01 RHR-A-HX-UNIT-FAIL           201 
201.02 RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL           201 
710.01 EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS           710 
710.02 EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS           710 
710.03 LOOP           710 
928.01 SL-A-BREAK           928, 9757 
928.02 COND-B-FAIL           928, 3062 
928.03 EFW-A-MP-FAIL           928, 3062, 3666 
1360.01 FW-A-MP-FAIL           1360, 3666 
1360.02 FW-B-MP-FAIL           1360, 3666 
1360.03 VT2A-FAIL           1360 
1360.04 VT2B-FAIL           1360, 3062, 3666 
3062.01 COND-A-FAIL           3062 
3062.02 EFW-A-SP-FAIL           3062, 3666 
9757.01 SWITCHYARD-FAIL           9757 
9757.02 VE2A-FAIL           9757 
9757.03 VE3A-FAIL           9757 
9757.04 VS2A-FAIL           9757 
9757.05 VS2B-FAIL           9757 
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Table 20: Element Build List with Complete Information Fields 
ID# IDName Name Type Location Modes Train System Cyber? Flood? Fire? Operator? Target Sets 




RPS Y Y Y N 
7, 201, 710, 1360, 
3062, 3666 
7.02 CCW-COMP-FAIL Comp. Cool Water Cool Sys. AUX 1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
CCW Y N Y N 7, 928 
14.01 RCS-LBLOCA Large Break LOCA LOCA Cont. 1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
RCS N N Y N 14, 30 
14.02 ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-A CL injection line A Pipe Cont. 1,2,3,4,5,6 A SIS A N N N N 14 
14.03 ACC-PIPE-INJ-LINE-B CL injection line B Pipe Cont. 1,2,3,4,5,6 B SIS B N N N N 14 
30.01 
HHSI-A-PUMP-UNIT-
FAIL High Pres Inj Pump A Pump AUX 1,2,3,4 A SIS A Y Y Y N 30 
30.02 
HHSI-B-PUMP-UNIT-
FAIL High Pres Inj Pump B Pump AUX 1,2,3,4 B SIS B Y Y Y N 30 
201.01 RHR-A-HX-UNIT-FAIL RHR Heat Exc. A HX AUX 1,2,3,4,5,6 A RHR A N N Y N 201 
201.02 RHR-B-HX-UNIT-FAIL RHR Heat Exc. B HX AUX 1,2,3,4,5,6 B RHR B N N Y N 201 
710.01 EDG-A-UNIT-FAILS EDG System A EDG EDG A 1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
EDG A Y Y Y N 710 
710.02 EDG-B-UNIT-FAILS EDG System B EDG EDG B 1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
EDG B Y Y Y N 710 




Power Y Y Y N 710 
928.01 SL-A-BREAK Steam/FW ln bk A SL break TB 1,2,3,4 A MSSS A N N Y N 928, 9757 
928.02 COND-B-FAIL Condenser B Condenser TB 1,2,3,4 B MSSS B N N Y N 928, 3062 
928.03 EFW-A-MP-FAIL EFW A motor pump Pump EFW A 1,2,3,4 A EFW A Y Y Y N 928, 3062, 3666 
1360.01 FW-A-MP-FAIL FW A motor pump Pump TB 1,2,3,4 A MSSS A Y Y Y N 1360, 3666 
1360.02 FW-B-MP-FAIL FW B motor pump Pump TB 1,2,3,4 B MSSS B Y Y Y N 1360, 3666 
1360.03 VT2A-FAIL Steam-Atm valve A Valve TB 1,2,3,4 A SD A Y Y Y Y 1360 
1360.04 VT2B-FAIL Steam-Cond valve A Valve TB 1,2,3,4 B SD B Y Y Y Y 1360, 3062, 3666 
3062.01 COND-A-FAIL Condenser A Condenser TB 1,2,3,4 A MSSS A Y Y Y N 3062 
3062.02 EFW-A-SP-FAIL EFW A steam pump Pump EFW Bld A 1,2,3,4 A EFW A Y Y Y N 3062, 3666 
9757.01 SWITCHYARD-FAIL Unit Switchyard Switchyard Switchyard 1,2,3,4,5,6 
 
Power Y Y Y N 9757 
9757.02 VE2A-FAIL EFW A SP valve Valve Cont. 1,2,3,4 A EFW A Y Y Y N 9757 
9757.03 VE3A-FAIL EFW A transfer valve Valve Cont. 1,2,3,4 A EFW A Y Y Y N 9757 
9757.04 VS2A-FAIL RHR A Inj line Valve Valve AUX 1,2,3,4,5,6 A RHR A Y Y Y N 9757 
9757.05 VS2B-FAIL RHR B Inj line Valve Valve AUX 1,2,3,4,5,6 B RHR B Y Y Y N 9757 
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